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Abstract
Most of the assets on the balance sheet of typical banks are illiquid. This exposes
banks to liquidity risk, which is one of the key risks for banks. Since the value of
assets is determined by their risks, liquidity risk should be included in valuation.
This paper develops a valuation framework for liquidity risk. It is argued that
the liquidity risk that illiquid assets on bank balance sheets are exposed to, is
the risk of being liquidated at a discount in a liquidity stress event (LSE). This
may be contrasted to extensions of CAPM including liquidity risk, where liquidity
risk is considered to be the risk of changes in liquidity of a security. The main
result is that the discount rate used for valuation includes a liquidity spread that
is composed of three factors: 1. the probability of an LSE, 2. the severity of an
LSE, and 3. the liquidation value of the asset.
The liquidity risk of a bank is determined mainly by its funding composi-
tion. An interesting connection to funds transfer pricing and funding valuation
adjustment exists for a special bank balance sheet where the income from liquidity
spreads and the costs of funding are equal. In particular, in this case the valuation
adjustment due to liquidity risk is proportional to liquidity of the asset and the
funding valuation adjustment.
∗Earlier versions of this paper were titled “Discounting Cashflows of Illiquid Assets on
Bank Balance Sheet” .
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1 Introduction
One of the main risks of a bank is liquidity risk. This is reflected by, for instance,
the inclusion of liquidity risk measures in the Basel 3 framework [1]. Already before
Basel 3 the BIS issued the paper “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management
and Supervision” [2], aimed at strengthening liquidity risk management in banks.
This paper stresses the importance of liquidity risk as follows: “Liquidity is the
ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come
due, without incurring unacceptable losses. The fundamental role of banks in the
maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks
inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and
those affecting markets as a whole.”
Since liquidity risk may result in actual losses, this paper argues it should
be included in the valuation of balance sheet items. This paper assumes that
the liabilities are liquid and as such are valued consistently with market prices.
Instead the impact of liquidity risk on the valuation of assets is considered. The
aim is to develop a valuation framework for liquidity risk that can be applied
consistently across the different assets on a bank balance sheet. In particular the
aim is to include derivatives, other traded assets, but also banking book assets.
Banking book assets are held at historical cost and therefore their valuation is not
required for financial reporting. Nevertheless valuation is important to calculate
sensitivities such as duration and PV01’s. Valuation of banking book assets is also
important to determine profitability of assets. Therefore, although for accounting
purposes valuation of banking book items is not relevant, these are included in the
valuation framework developed here.
The research in this paper is motivated by a number of questions regarding
the valuation of assets:
1. What is the impact of liquidity risk on the valuation of assets?
2. Liquidity risk events typically involve some complex dynamics. Can assets
be valued without modelling the full complicated dynamics?
3. It is well know from research in recent years that investors do expect a
discount in the price for illiquid assets. But how do individual investors, in
this paper specifically banks, determine at what discount they are willing to
buy or sell?
4. How are liquidity discounts of different assets related?
5. How does the funding composition affect the valuation including liquidity
risk? In particular, how does the inclusion of liquidity risk in the valuation
of assets relate to recent proposals to include funding costs in the valuation
of derivatives?
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To address these questions this paper considers the impact of a bank’s liquidity
risk on the value of its assets. The purpose of this paper is to value this risk con-
sistently across all assets on a bank’s balance sheet, such as securities, mortgages,
loans, and derivatives.
The approach focuses on the discounting of cashflows generated by the different
assets. It is recognized that the discounting of cashflows of assets is determined
by their liquidity through the possibility that the bank has to liquidate (a fraction
of) the asset in the event of liquidity stress. As a consequence the discount rate
includes a liquidity spread. The main result of this paper is that the liquidity
spread is composed of the probability of a liquidity stress event (an event in which
the bank is forced to sell some of its assets), the severity of the liquidity stress
event, and the liquidation value of the asset.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Firstly, section 2 develops a liquidity
risk valuation framework and discusses some consequences. Section 3 extends the
model to include credit risk and optionality. Section 4 considers the impact of
the funding composition. In section 5 a paradox is discussed and the value of the
assets on a stylized bank balance sheet is calculated. Lastly the conclusions are
summarized.
2 Liquidity Risk Valuation Framework
2.1 First pass: Liquidity risk and valuation
In recent years the impact of liquidity risk on pricing of assets has been studied. In
particular, research has been done to extend the CAPM model to include liquidity
risk, such as the work of Acharya and Pedersen [3]. It is useful to recall these
extensions to clarify the differences with the approach in this paper.
Acharya and Pedersen define a stochastic illiquidity cost Ci for security i that
follows a normal process in discrete time. The illiquidity cost is interpreted as the
cost of selling the security. Furthermore it is assumed that an investor buying a
security at time t will sell the security at time t + 1. Liquidity risk in this model
comes from the uncertainty of the cost of selling the security. With this set-up
Acharya and Pedersen derive a liquidity-adjusted CAPM with three additional
betas.
Although the extension of CAPM including liquidity risk is useful to under-
stand prices of traded assets, such as securities, it does not help to understand the
valuation of most of the assets on a bank’s balance sheet. The reason is that most
of these assets are not traded. Loans, mortgage, and other assets in the banking
book are intended to be held to maturity. Hence assuming the asset will be sold
and assuming a stochastic cost is not appropriate for these assets. Even assets in
the trading book may not be traded. For instance OTC derivatives, whose market
risks will be hedged through trading hedge instruments, may well be held to ma-
turity. Hence the CAPM approach, which assumes that an asset needs to be sold
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and model liquidity risk by stochastic liquidity costs, is not appropriate for most
assets on a bank balance sheet.
The question is how these assets that are intended to be held to maturity are
sensitive to liquidity risk. Whatever the changes in liquidity cost, as long as these
assets are held to maturity as intended, their pay-off is not affected by liquidity
risk. Hence it seems that these assets are not sensitive to liquidity risk, which
would imply that liquid and illiquid assets with the same pay-off should have the
same value.
The resolution this paper proposes is that, although the assets may be intended
to be held to maturity, when the bank is experiencing a liquidity stress event, the
bank may be forced to liquidate some of its assets at a discount. Therefore the
pay-off generated by the asset may be lower than the contractual pay-off when a
bank is exposed to liquidity risk. This discount should be reflected in the value of
the asset. It is clear that an illiquid asset, which has a larger discount in a forced
liquidation than a liquid asset, will have a lower value (when they have the same
contractual pay-off).
These considerations lead to the following definition of liquidity risk is used in
this paper:
Definition: Liquidity risk is the risk for an event to occur, that would force a
bank to liquidate some of its assets.
Such an event can therefore be termed a liquidity stress event (LSE).
In the next section, a simple model for such events is proposed.
2.2 Liquidity Risk Model
In this paper LSEs are modelled as random events. The model consists of three
components:
• The probability that an LSE occurs: PL(t1, t2) will denote the probability
of such an event between t1 and t2.
• The severity of an LSE. The severity will be indicated by the fraction of
the assets that a bank needs to liquidate f . By definition 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. For
simplicity f will be assumed to be a fixed (non-random) number.
• The dependence structure of LSEs and other events. The model assumes
that LSEs are assumed to be independent from each other and from other
events such as credit risk or market risk events.
In particular, the model assumes that LSEs follow a Poisson process with a con-
stant intensity p ≥ 0, which implies for an infinitesimal time interval dt
PL(t, t+ dt) = pdt. (2.1)
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This set-up simplifies the complicated dynamics of an LSE to the probability
that the event occurs and the fraction of assets that the bank needs to liquidate
in such an event. This simplification is justified since, the return of the asset to
the bank is only affected by whether or not it needs to be liquidated. Hence the
value of an asset depends on above effective parameters.
Of course, more insight in the liquidity risk of a bank is obtained by considering
all potential contributors, such as retail deposits run-off, wholesale funding risk,
collateral outflows, intraday risks etc. However for the valuation of an asset it only
matters if and when it gets liquidated, not if the liquidation is a result of retail
deposits or wholesale funding withdrawal.
The interpretation of above model is that the bank gets hit at random times
by an LSE. In particular, the bank has at any time the same risk of being hit
by an LSE, there is no notion of increased risk. An extension of the model that
would support multiple states, such as “high risk” and “low risk” with different
probabilities of an LSE and some probabilities to migrate from one state to the
other, might be more realistic, but would also have many more parameters to
calibrate. As discussed later, the lack of traded instruments to hedge liquidity
risk make it difficult to calibrate the parameters to traded market instruments.
Because of the inherent difficulties to calibrate parameters for liquidity risk, this
paper chooses the above set-up with a minimum of parameters that need to be
assessed.
2.3 Valuation with liquidity risk
In an LSE a bank will liquidate some of its assets. These assets will be sold at a
discount depending on the liquidity of the asset. This discount in case of an LSE
may be recognized by defining an effective pay-off.
Effective pay-off =
{
contractual pay-off if no LSE occurs
stressed value if LSE occurs
(2.2)
The contractual pay-off includes all cashflows of the asset, for example optionality,
cashflows in case of default, cashflows if triggers are hit etc.
The stressed value includes the discount for liquidating part of the position in
the LSE. In case of a single LSE at time τ the stressed value may be expressed as
stressed value = fAV (τ)LV + (1− fA)V (τ), (2.3)
where V (τ) is the value of the asset at time τ , fA is the fraction of the asset that
the bank will liquidate, and LV is the liquidation value as a fraction of the value
of the asset. It is assumed here that assets are divisible and any part of the assets
can be liquidated.
The fraction fA of the asset that the bank will liquidate will be determined by
a liquidation strategy. In the next section the liquidation strategy that should be
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used in valuation is derived.
Definition: The value of an asset under liquidity risk is defined as the present
value of the effective pay-off
V = PV [Effective pay-off] (2.4)
Consider a cashflow of an illiquid asset at some future time T . In absence of
default risk the value at time t of the cashflow is related to the value at time t+dt
through
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+dt)(1−pdt)+e−rdt[fAV (t+dt)LV +(1−fA)V (t+dt)]pdt (2.5)
The first term on the r.h.s. is the contribution from the scenario that no LSE occurs
between t and t+dt, the second term is based on (2.3) and is the contribution from
the scenario that an LSE occurs. The contribution from multiple LSEs between t
and t+dt may be neglected as long as p is finite, since this contribution is of order
(pdt)2 and dt is infinitesimal small.
Equation (2.5) may be rewritten as
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− p(1− LV )fdt] . (2.6)
By introducing a liquidity spread
l = p(1− LV )fA , (2.7)
this becomes
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)(1− ldt). (2.8)
The value of a cashflow at a future time T of notional 1 in absence of default
risk is derived by iterating (2.8)
V = e−(r+l)T , (2.9)
since limdt↓0(1− ldt)T/dt = e−lT .
The liquidity spread (2.7) used in discounting depends on the fraction of the
asset fA that a bank liquidates, this fraction will be determined in the next section.
2.4 Liquidation strategy
Consider a balance sheet with a set of assets Ai with i = 1, 2, ..., N , where Ai de-
notes the market value and each asset has a unique liquidation value LVi. Without
loss of generality an ordering of the assets can be assumed: LVi > LVj if i < j.
Definition: A liquidation strategy for a set of assets Ai is a set of fractions si
of assets to sell such that
N∑
i=1
siAi = f
N∑
i=1
Ai. (2.10)
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with 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and the sum over i covers all assets on the balance sheet. Here Ai
denote the market values of the assets.
Such a strategy could be, for instance, to sell the most liquid assets until suf-
ficient assets have been liquidated to reach f
∑
iAi. Note that the strategy is
allowed to depend on the order of the assets, but not on the liquidation values
LVi. The motivation is that a bank’s liquidation strategy will be, more likely, of
the type to liquidate assets based on their relative liquidity (e.g. most liquid assets
first) instead of on their exact liquidation values.
Definition: An admissible liquidation strategy is a strategy s∗i such that the
liquidity spreads implied by the strategy
li = p(1− LVi)s∗i , (2.11)
satisfy the condition that for any set LVi
LVi < LVj ⇒ li > lj . (2.12)
Definition: An optimal admissible liquidation strategy is an admissible liqui-
dation strategy with the lowest loss in an LSE. This loss is defined as
loss =
∑
i
siAi(1− LVi) . (2.13)
To demonstrate that the optimal admissible liquidation strategy is given by
s∗i = s
∗
j for all i, j, it first needs to be noted that a strategy with si > sj for
i < j is not an admissible strategy. Consider e.g. s1 > s2. Then the choice
LV1 = LV2+
s1−s2
2s1
(1−LV2) implies l1 > l2. (It can be checked that this expression
for LV1 is a valid choice in the sense that LV1 > LV2 and LV1 < 1.) Therefore
s1 > s2 violates the requirement (2.12). Note that the same reasoning can be
applied to any i, j with i < j, and that it is sufficient to have one choice of LV’s
that violates (2.12), since definition (2.12) should hold for any set LV’s.
It can be concluded that the set of admissible liquidation strategies may be
characterized by: s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3 ≤ ... ≤ sN , where N denotes the last asset. Within
this set the optimal choice is s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN , since it will lead to the
lowest loss for the bank in an LSE. The conclusion is that the optimal admissible
strategy is specified by s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN = f .
The final step in the completion of the valuation framework is the determi-
nation what fraction of an asset f in (2.7) a bank will liquidate in an LSE. The
optimal admissible liquidation strategy has been defined to determine this frac-
tion. It is the natural choice for valuation of possible liquidation strategies, since it
preserves the relation between liquidation values and liquidity spreads (2.12) and
within this admissible set minimizes the loss of the liquidation of assets.
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2.5 Summary of the model
Putting the above liquidity risk model, valuation approach and optimal admissible
liquidation strategy together the result is the following.
A cashflow at time T of an asset Ai without default risk should be discounted
with the discount factor
DF = e−(r+li)T , (2.14)
where the liquidity spread is given by
li = p(1− LVi)f. (2.15)
Note that the discount factor of the cashflow depends on the liquidity of the asset
that generates the cashflow through LVi. The other two factors, the probability of
an LSE p and the severity of an LSE f , are not asset specific, but are determined
by the balance sheet of the bank.
2.6 Some consequences of the model
A consequence of (2.15) is that liquidity spreads of different assets (on the same
balance sheet) are related. Since in (2.15) the probability of an LSE and the
fraction of assets that need to be liquidated are the same for all assets, it follows
immediately that
li
lj
=
1− LVi
1− LVj . (2.16)
The liquidity spread of asset i and asset j are related through their liquidation
values.
A nice feature of the model is that it allows to explain a different discount
rate for a bond and a loan. Consider, for example, a zero-coupon bond and a
loan with the same issuer/obligor, same maturity, notional, and seniority. The
zero-coupon bond and loan therefore have exactly the same pay-off (even in case
of default). Nevertheless if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded, a difference
in valuation is expected. The model developed here, can provide an explanation
for this difference. The above relation (2.16) shows that the liquidity spreads
are related through the liquidation values of the zero-coupon and the loan. For
example, if the probability of an LSE for a bank is estimated at 5% per year,
and the severity of the event is that 20% of the assets need to be sold, and the
liquidation value for the ZC-bond is estimated at 80% and for the loan at 0% (since
the loan cannot be sold or securitized quickly enough) then the liquidity spreads
for the bond and loan are:
lbond = 20bp, (2.17)
lloan = 100bp. (2.18)
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These spreads are based on above example, and may differ significantly between
banks. Nevertheless, they clarify that it is natural in this framework that a different
discount rate is used for loans and bonds.
In this framework also the position size will affect the discount rate. Empirical
studies find a linear relation between the size of the sale and the price impact
[4, 5]. In the context of this paper this translates into a linear relation between
the position size and the liquidation value:
LVi = cxi (2.19)
where xi is the size of position in asset i, e.g. the number of bonds, and c a constant.
Consider a different position xj in the same asset. From (2.16) it immediately
follows that
li
lj
=
xi
xj
. (2.20)
Given a linear relation between the size of a sale and the price impact, the frame-
work derived here implies a linear relation between liquidity spread and position
size.
2.7 Replication and Parameter Estimation
One of the important concepts in finance is the valuation of derivatives through
determining the price of a (dynamic) replication strategy. Unfortunately, liquidity
risk is a risk that cannot be replicated or hedged. In principle it is conceivable
that products will be developed that guarantee a certain price for a large sale;
e.g. for a certain period the buyer of the guarantee can sell N shares for a value
N × S, where S denotes the value of a single share. Such products would help in
determining market implied liquidation values, but it is difficult to imagine that
such products will be developed that apply to large parts of the balance sheet.
In any case, currently liquidity risk cannot be hedged. Nevertheless the risk
should be valued. Therefore it seems appropriate to use the physical probability
of an LSE and liquidation value to determine the liquidity spread in (2.15) as
opposed to an imaginary risk neutral probability and liquidation value. Clearly,
if it would be possible to hedge this risk then the risk neutral values implied by
market prices should be used.
The physical probability of LSEs and the severity of the events are required
to estimate the liquidity spread, see (2.15). These may be difficult to estimate.
Perhaps more importantly, in the absence of hedge instruments and associated
implied parameters, estimates may be less objective than desired.
On the other hand a bank should already have a good insight in the liquidity
risk it is exposed to. E.g. through stress testing a bank has insight in the impact
of different liquidity stress events. The BIS paper “Principles for Sound Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervision” [2] gives guidance to banks how to perform
stress tests. Such stress tests should provide some provide insight in bank-specific
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risks, that in combination with market perception of liquidity risk through e.g.
liquidity spreads on traded instruments should provide estimates for p and f .
3 Extensions of the model
3.1 Including Credit Risk
This section adds credit risk to the framework. Recall (2.6) with (2.7). The
inclusion of default risk is straightforward under the assumption that default events
are independent from LSEs. The result is
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− ldt− pd× LGDdt] , (3.1)
where pd is the instantaneous probability of default and LGD the Loss Given
Default. By introducing a credit spread
scredit = pd× LGD (3.2)
and solving (3.1) in a similar way as (2.6) gives the following value of a cashflow
of nominal 1
V = e−(r+l+scredit)T . (3.3)
The discount rate consists of a risk-free rate, a liquidity spread and a credit spread.
3.2 Liquidity Risk for Derivatives
Liquidity risk also affects the value of derivatives. In a Black-Scholes framework
liquidity risk results in an extra term in the PDE [6].
A brief derivation starts from a delta-hedged derivative’s position. Demanding
that the value of riskless portfolio of derivative’s position and delta-hedge grows
at the risk-free rate gives
dV −∆dS = r(V −∆S)dt, (3.4)
where V denotes not the value of the derivative, but the value of the derivative’s
position, as indicated above. The Delta has the usual definition: ∆ = ∂SV , and
S denotes the underlying that follows a geometric Brownian motion. Including
liquidity risk
dV = ∂tV dt+ ∂SV dS +
1
2
σ2S2∂2SV − f(1− LVV ) max(V, 0)dN, (3.5)
The last term on the r.h.s. is the extra term coming from liquidity risk, here N
follows a Poisson process with intensity p. LVV denotes the liquidation value of
the derivative. The max-function reflects that the value of the derivative can be
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both positive and negative (depending on the type of derivative) and that only
positions with a positive value will be potentially liquidated in an LSE.
Taking the expectation of the Poisson process dN , under the assumption of
independence with dS gives
∂tV + rS∂SV +
1
2
σ2S2∂2SV = rV + lV max(V, 0). (3.6)
Here V denotes the value of the derivative’s position, S the underlying stock, σ the
volatility, and lV the liquidity spread of the derivative’s position. The last term
on the r.h.s. is the extra term coming from liquidity risk and is in fact equivalent
to the last term on the r.h.s. of (2.8). Note that it is assumed that the underlying
is perfectly liquid (in the sense that its liquidation value LV = 1).
In [6] also extensions of (3.6) are discussed that include credit risk.
A remarkable feature of (3.6) is that it is similar to models that some authors
have proposed for inclusion of funding costs in the valuation of derivatives. In
particular the extra term lV max(V, 0) has the exact same form as the term for
inclusion of funding costs derived by e.g. [7], with funding spread replaced by
liquidity spread. The model above is more complex than the model including
funding costs since the liquidity spread may be dependent on, for example, position
size.
4 Funding costs and liquidity risk
The probability and severity of an LSE for a bank is largely determined by its
funding composition. In the previous sections we treated the funding of a bank
simply as a given, which resulted in some liquidity risk that should be included
in the valuation of assets. Here the funding is considered more explicitly, through
two examples:
1. adding an asset to the balance sheet that is term funded,
2. considering a special balance sheet where the income from the liquidity
spreads exactly compensates the funding spread costs.
4.1 Adding an asset that is term funded
Consider the following simple balance sheet
Ai Lj
E
where all assets Ai have the same maturity T , without optionality or coupon
payments. These could be thought of as a combination of zero coupon bonds and
bullet loans. The liabilities have varying maturities and may include for instance
non-maturity demand deposits.
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Define the impact of liquidity risk on the total value of the assets as the Liq-
uidity Risk Adjustment (LRA)
LRA =
∑
i
Ai −
∑
i
A0i (4.1)
where A0i is the value of the asset without liquidity risk
A0i = Ai(li = 0) = Aie
liT (4.2)
Now consider adding an asset Anew with the same maturity T that is term
funded. The question is what is the impact on the LRA. The new LRA is
LRAnew =
∑
i
Anewi −
∑
i
A0i +Anew −A0new (4.3)
where Anewi is the value with the new liquidity spread after adding the new asset
and its term funding.
To estimate the impact on LRA the first step is to determine the new liquidity
spread. Clearly the liquidation values LVi of the assets do not change. Also the
probability of an LSE is not expected to change, since the funding composition has
not changed for the exception of adding a liability with the same maturity as the
assets, which therefore does not contribute to the probability of an LSE. The only
change is in the fraction of assets that need to be liquidated. Since the funding
withdrawn in an LSE is the same before or after adding the asset when the asset
is term-funded, the following relation holds:
[
∑
i
Ai +A
new]fnew = [
∑
i
Ai]f
old (4.4)
Hence the new fraction is
fnew =
∑
iAi∑
iAi +A
new
fold (4.5)
The old and new liquidity spreads are given by
loldi = p(1− LVi)fold (4.6)
lnewi = p(1− LVi)fnew (4.7)
The impact of adding the term-funded asset on the LRA is
LRAnew − LRA =
∑
i
(Anewi −Ai) +Anew −A0new (4.8)
=
∑
i
(Aie
−(lnewi −loldi T −Ai) +Anew −Anewe−lnewT (4.9)
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Expanding this expression to first order in Anew/(
∑
iAi) gives
LRAnew − LRA = Anew(lav − lnew)T, (4.10)
where lav = (
∑
i liAi)/(
∑
iAi). Hence, even though the new asset is term-funded
the liquidity risk adjustment does change. The reason is that the new asset and
its term funding is not isolated from the rest of the balance sheet. In an LSE the
new asset may also (partly) be liquidated. And indeed, in the liquidation strategy
derived in section 2.4 for valuation, it will be pro rata liquidated.
Equation (4.10) shows that the LRA increases when the new asset added is
more liquid than the other assets on average.
4.2 A special balance sheet that balances funding costs
and liquidity spread income
Up to now only the valuation of assets has been considered. However a bank also
manages the income generated from these assets. From an income perspective a
bank would want that the liquidity spread it earns on its assets is (at least) equal
to the funding spreads it pays on its liabilities and equity:∑
i
liAi =
∑
j
sFj Lj + s
EE (4.11)
where sFj is defined as the spread on liability Lj relative to the risk-free rate r and
sE the spread paid on equity.
Define the average funding rate as
sF =
∑
j r
F
j Lj + r
EE∑
j Lj + E
(4.12)
Then it is clear that (4.11) implies that the average liquidity spread equals the
average funding spread
sF = lav (4.13)
Hence the liquidity spread for asset Ai in this special case is related to the average
funding spread by
li =
(1− LVi)
(1− LVav)rF (4.14)
This suggests that in this special case a bank can charge for liquidity risk
through its funding costs when it corrects for the liquidity of the asset. In particular
• In the FTP framework of such a bank, the funding costs can be charged
for the assets, but would differentiate between funding of liquid and illiquid
assets through the factor (1−LVi)(1−LVav) . E.g. the FTP for a mortgage portfolio
would go down when a bank has securitized these (but have kept them on
the balance sheet), since liquidation value LV of securitized mortgages is
higher.
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• Similarly the liquidity risk adjustment, introduced in the previous section,
of a derivative is related to the Funding Valuation Adjustment that some
authors have proposed. The LRA would however distinguish between liquid
and less liquid derivatives, such as an OTC and exchange traded option that
are otherwise the same. An example is given in [6].
Remains the question how “special” this special case is. Many banks would
recognize (4.11) as something they apply ignoring the commercial margins on both
sides of the balance sheet. However, most banks base their liquidity spreads on
their funding costs, although (4.11) may be satisfied, its the liquidity spreads do
not accurately price the liquidity risk of the bank. Nevertheless, adjusting for the
liquidity of an asset according to (4.14) may improve pricing to account for the
liquidity of the asset.
5 A paradox and an example
5.1 A paradox
As discussed in section 2 the liquidity spread is determined by the loss from a forced
sale of part of the assets in a liquidity stress event. The applied sell strategy is to
sell the same fraction of each asset. In practice however one would sell the most
liquid assets as this results in a smaller loss. Since a larger loss is accounted for
in the valuation, it seems that a risk-free profit can be obtained by holding an
appropriate amount of liquid assets or cash as a buffer for a liquidity stress event.
To analyze the paradox, consider a bank with a simple balance sheet, as shown
below
A = 80 L = 80
C = 20 E = 20
This bank has 80 illiquid assets, 20 cash, and its funding consists of 80 liabilities,
and 20 equity. It is exposed to an LSE where 20% of the funding is instantaneously
removed.
If the stress event occurs the resulting balance sheet used in the valuation is
A = 64 L = 60
C = 16 E = 20
The sale of the assets will result in a loss = (1− LVA)16. This loss is born by the
equity holders, who in this setup, provide the amount (1− LVA)16. This amount
combined with the result from the sale of the assets LVA16, and a cash amount
of 4 covers the withdrawal of funding. Note that this can be viewed as a two-step
approach whereby the funding withdrawal is covered by the cash and immediately
supplemented by the sale of the assets and the cash provided by the equity holders.
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In practice a bank will use its cash buffer to compensate the loss of funding.
In contrast to the strategy of the pro rata sale of assets used for valuation, this
strategy will not lead to a loss. The resulting balance sheet is
A = 80 L = 60
C = 0 E = 20
The paradox is that the value of the assets includes the possibility of a loss
(through the liquidity spread), whereas in reality this loss seems to be avoided by
using the cash as a buffer.
However, the bank is now vulnerable to a next LSE, whereby 20% of its funding
is withdrawn. To be able to withstand such an event a cash buffer of 16 is required.
To avoid any liquidity risk this buffer should be realized immediately, which can
be achieved by the same sale of assets as in the strategy for valuation, resulting in
the same loss. Therefore, to avoid any liquidity risk the same loss is born by the
equity holders, which resolves the paradox.
In practice the assets may be sold over a larger period of time, thereby the
bank chooses to accept some liquidity risk to avoid the full loss by an immediate
sale. The optimal strategy in practice is the result of risk reward considerations.
5.2 Example for a stylized balance sheet
Consider the following stylized balance sheet of a bank.
retail loans 10 deposits 60
corporate loans 20 wholesale funding 30
mortgages 40 equity 10
central bank eligible bonds 10
corporate bonds> AA− 10
cash 10
The bank has considered its vulnerability to liquidity stress events, and it
concludes that in a stress event its deposits can reduce by 15 and its wholesale
funding also by an amount 15 within 3 months. The probability of such an event
is estimated at 5% per year. The translates into the parameters
p = 5% FL = 30% (5.1)
The bank decides to base the liquidation values of its assets on the Basel 3 Required
Stable Funding (RSF) factors. The basel document [1] states:“The RSF factors
assigned to various types of assets are parameters intended to approximate the
amount of a particular asset that could not be monetised through sale or use as
collateral in a secured borrowing on an extended basis during a liquidity event
lasting one year”. Although this does not exactly match the definition of the
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liquidity stress event identified by the bank, since the bank’s stress event only
lasts 3 months, the bank chooses to identify
1− LV = RSF (5.2)
for each asset.
The result for the liquidity spread for the different assets is given in the table
below.
Asset RSF liquidity spread (in bp)
retail loans 85% 127.5
corporate loans 65% 97.5
mortgages 65% 97.5
central bank eligible bonds 50% 75
corporate bonds> AA− 20% 30
cash 0% 0
The above liquidity spreads are the result of the assumptions of the bank in the
above example. For a specific bank the liquidity spreads depend on bank-specific
features, such as the fraction of stable, less-stable, and non-stable deposits, which
affect FL and p. Nevertheless the stylized bank above illustrates how different
assets get different liquidity spreads.
A slightly extended version of this example is included in [6], where also the
valuation of call options is considered.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a liquidity risk valuation framework. It is shown that liquidity
risk of a bank affects the economic value of its assets. The starting observation
is that under an LSE the bank needs to liquidate some of its assets, which means
these will be sold at a discount. To develop the valuation framework a liquidation
strategy of the bank needs to be determined. It is shown that the optimal liqui-
dation strategy suitable for valuation is a strategy where of each asset the same
fraction is liquidated. The result is that cashflows are discounted including a liq-
uidity spread. This liquidity spread consists of three factors: the probability of an
LSE, the severity of an LSE, and the asset-specific discount in case of liquidation
in an LSE.
The answers to the questions posed in the introduction have been addressed
in the main text. Here the answers are summarized:
1. Liquidity risk has an impact on the valuation of assets. This research sug-
gests that the impact on the valuation is determined by the above mentioned
three factors.
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2. The valuation framework in this paper does not involve modelling the com-
plex dynamics of LSEs. Determination of the probability and severity of
LSEs in combination with the liquidity of the assets is sufficient.
3. In this framework the discount that banks should use to value illiquid assets
is determined by the liquidity spread derived.
4. The framework implies that the liquidity spread of two assets on the same
balance sheet is related through a simple relation involving only the liqui-
dation values of the assets (2.16). This suggests the same relation should
hold for traded prices of liquid and less liquid assets (at least if a sufficient
number of investors trades both assets). This allows for an empirical test of
the model.
5. Liquidity risk enters the valuation of assets in a very similar way as funding
costs do in some recent proposals to include funding costs in the valuation
of derivatives.
A few other noteworthy consequences of the valuation framework developed
here:
• The value of a position is not independent of the rest of the balance sheet,
since the balance sheet determines probability of an LSE and the severity
of an LSE. In particular the same position on two different balance sheets
may be valued differently.
• Two pay-offs that are exactly the same, but have a different liquidity may
be valued differently. For example, a bullet loan and a zero-coupon bond
of the same obligor/issuer with the exact same pay-off will have different
liquidity spreads if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded (and the bullet
loan is not).
• The size of a position affects the valuation. E.g. if a position in bonds
is large compared to the turnover in an LSE, the liquidation value of the
position may be lower than the liquidation value of a single bond. Therefore
a large position will have a higher liquidity spread than a small position.
• The securitization of illiquid assets, such as loans and mortgages, into more
liquid securities enhances the value of the assets. Within the liquidity risk
valuation framework developed here, it is possible to estimate this value.
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